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85 lines
3.3 KiB
85 lines
3.3 KiB
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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"""
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oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.signature_only
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This module is an implementation of the signing logic of OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849.
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"""
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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
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import logging
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from .. import errors
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from .base import BaseEndpoint
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log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class SignatureOnlyEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
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"""An endpoint only responsible for verifying an oauth signature."""
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def validate_request(self, uri, http_method='GET',
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body=None, headers=None):
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"""Validate a signed OAuth request.
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:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
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:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
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:param body: The request body as a string.
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:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
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:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
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1. True if valid, False otherwise.
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2. An oauthlib.common.Request object.
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"""
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try:
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request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
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except errors.OAuth1Error as err:
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log.info(
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'Exception caught while validating request, %s.' % err)
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return False, None
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try:
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self._check_transport_security(request)
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self._check_mandatory_parameters(request)
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except errors.OAuth1Error as err:
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log.info(
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'Exception caught while validating request, %s.' % err)
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return False, request
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if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce(
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request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request):
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log.debug('[Failure] verification failed: timestamp/nonce')
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return False, request
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# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
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# receiving a request with invalid client credentials.
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# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
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# a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant
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# time request verification.
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#
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# Note that early exit would enable client enumeration
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valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key(
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request.client_key, request)
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if not valid_client:
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request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client
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valid_signature = self._check_signature(request)
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# log the results to the validator_log
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# this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis
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request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client
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request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature
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# We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for
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# calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every
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# request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values
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# have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and
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# prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information
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v = all((valid_client, valid_signature))
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if not v:
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log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.")
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log.info("Valid client: %s", valid_client)
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log.info("Valid signature: %s", valid_signature)
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return v, request
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